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The Allure of the Illogic: A
Coherent Solution for Rule 703
Requires More Than Redefining
"Facts or Data"
by Paul R. Rice*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his article entitled Developing A Coherent Theory of the Structure

of Federal Rule of Evidence 703,' Professor Imwinkelried proposes a
theory for the interpretation of Rule 703.2 He argues that a restrictive
interpretation of the terms "facts or data" in Rule 703 would resolve the

conflicts that have plagued that Rule. Professor Imwinkelried's proposal
would exclude research data and other background facts from the
definition of "facts or data." By his interpretation, when an expert is

testifying to an opinion based on facts that have not been proven at the
trial the expert witness may only rely on unproven case-specific
facts--facts directly related to the cause of action. While I disagree with

*

Professor of Law, The Washington College of Law, The American University.

Marshall University (B.B.A., 1965); West Virginia University (J.D., 1968); Yale University
(L.L.M., 1970).
I would like to express my appreciation to Patrick McAvoy, my Dean's Fellow, for his
superb editorial assistance.
1. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1996).
2. Id. at 450. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 703.
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his interpretation of the scope of the terms "facts or data," that
disagreement is unimportant to the serious problem with Rule 703 that
should be addressed in a "coherent" theory. That problem is a deeper,
more fundamental flaw in the logic of Rule 703 which Professor
Imwinkelried passingly acknowledged, but chose to ignore.' This is the
inconsistency in allowing expert witnesses to rely on facts that are not
before the jury (both case-specific facts and scientific or background
facts), and then pretending that those facts are not being accepted for
truth when the jury accepts and relies upon the expert witness'
conclusions.
Twitted by Professor Imwinkelried for having "been content to discuss
[this] individual issue[], without endeavoring to develop a coherent
theory of the structure of Rule 703,' I would like to take this opportunity to further open myself to his criticism by advancing that narrow issue
again and, hopefully, demonstrating that his "coherent" theory misses
the point.
Professor Imwinkelried first argues that the validity of the scientific
basis of expert witness testimony should be governed by Rule 703
because it was designed for that purpose.' After all, the Rule is entitled
"Basis of Expert Witness Testimony.' While I personally agree that the
basis of expert testimony should be controlled by the rule bearing that
title, Rule 703 establishes a standard for judicial screening of an expert
witness' basis only for facts or data, and that standard is applicable only
when the facts or data considered by the expert in arriving at. his
conclusion are not part of the factual record before the jury.7 Perhaps
this is why the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 702, not Rule 703,
controls the scientific basis of expert testimony.8

3. Imwinkelreid, supra note 1, at 475.
4. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 450.

5. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 452-54.
6. FED. R. EVID. 703.
7. Under Rule 703 the presiding judge must make a determination that the
inadmissible evidence relied upon was "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the

particular field." FED. R. EviD. 703.
8. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), the Court
expressly held that scientific experts' opinions are screened through the filter of the term
"scientific" in Rule 702. 113 S. Ct. at 2795. This, of course, was acknowledged by Professor
Imwinkelried. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 449. Rejecting the "general acceptance"

standard established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (addressing the
admissibility of the systolic blood pressure deception test-the lie detector tests-the court
established the test of "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.") the
Court instructed trial judges to independently assess the reliability of scientific expert
testimony, by employing the scientific expertise they have never possessed, to evaluate

scientific principles they have never understood! 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
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Throughout the remainder of his article, Professor Imwinkelried
identifies many of the disputes that exist about the interpretation of
Rule 703, and explains how limiting the expert's reliance on inadmissible
"facts or data" to "case-specific" facts or data, resolves those disputes.
I believe that his limited interpretation of "facts or data" is unjustified.
But more importantly, in focusing on those terms, he has lost sight of
the more fundamental problem of the Rule's illogic. Before examining
this disagreement and identifying the problem, however, the underlying
rationale of Rule 703 should be clean
II. THE PREMISES FOR RULE 703
Under the common law, the concept of logical relevance required that
experts base their opinion testimony only on evidence introduced at
trial.9 Stated differently, the expert had to give an opinion based on
facts known to the jury in order to assist the jury as the sole and
independent finder-of-facts. If the expert were permitted to rely on
evidence that the jury did not hear, the expert's role would no longer be
solely to assist the jury in understanding relevant technical and
scientific principles and interpreting the evidence to which those
principles should be applied. The expert would become an independent
finder-of-facts.' 0
The Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized
that in many cases experts have access to reliable hearsay that informs
their professional judgment. Even though the evidence may be
inadmissible hearsay, opinions premised on the evidence may still prove
helpful to the finder of fact because the expert has used her special skills
in assessing the reliability of the information and has determined that
the evidence is reliable enough for use in forming her opinion. The
Committee explained:

The opinion in Daubert did not address how nonscientific expert witness opinion
testimony is to be judicially screened. Presumably, this standard will be logical relevance
balanced against potential unfair prejudice-the standard of "helpfulness" that is implicit
in the Rule 702 requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact."
9. As 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15, at 24 (J. Strong, 4th ed. 1992) explains:
The essential reason in support of this view seemed to be that the jury was asked
to accept as evidence the witness' inference, based upon someone's hearsay or
upon other inadmissible facts which were presumably not supported by any
evidence at the trial and which therefore the jury had no basis for finding to be
true.
10. Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence As A Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A
Response to ProfessorCarlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 586-88 (1987).
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The third source [of information employed by expert witnesses]
contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of data to the expert
outside of court and other than by his own perception. In this respect
the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond
that current[ly permitted] in many jurisdictions and to bring the
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves
when not in court. 1
While the Committee recognized that these sources of information would
usually be admissible, the costs of laying the foundation for admission
would often involve "substantial time in producing and examining
various authenticating witnesses." 2 Therefore, the Committee concluded, that when experts, like physicians, "make[] life-and-death decisions
in reliance upon [this evidence], [their] validation, expertly performed
and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes." 3 As the California Revision Commission, whose work the Advisory
Committee relied upon, explained:
It is not practical to formulate a detailed statutory rule that lists all of
the matters upon which an expert may properly base his opinion, for
it would be necessary to prescribe specific rules applicable to each field
of expertise. This is clearly impossible; the subjects upon which expert
opinion may be received are too numerous to make statutory prescription of applicable rules a feasible venture. It is possible, however, to
formulate a general rule that specifies the minimum requisites that
must be met in every case, leaving to the courts the task of determining particular detail within the general framework. 4
Therefore, the Committee premised Rule 703 on the belief that if
experts, consistent with the general practices in their field, employ
special skills to evaluate the reliability of evidence and are willing to
form opinions based on that assessment, the courts should not require
more for the admissibility of those opinions. 5 The only requirement

11. See FED. R. EID. 703 Advisory Committee's Note (discussed in 56 F.R.D. 183, 283
(1973)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1995).
15. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th
Cir. 1975): "Years of experience teach the expert to separate the wheat from the chaff and
to use only those sources and kinds of information which are of a type reasonably relied
upon by similar experts in arriving at sound opinions on the subject." Also, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 15, at 24 (J. Strong, 4th ed. 1992) explains:
This view is justified on the ground that an expert in a science is competent to
judge the reliability of statements made to him by other investigators or
technicians. He is just as competent indeed to do this as a judge and jury are to
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explicitly stated in the Rule for the use of extra-judicial facts or data is
that they be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field." 6
This "reasonable reliance" requirement left at least two questions for
the courts to resolve. First, how should the trial judges determine
"reasonable reliance"? Second, how does the expert's reliance on this
otherwise inadmissible evidence effect the status of that evidence? Does
the acceptance of the opinion for its truth make the underlying facts
admissible for truth as well? I will address the issues in reverse order.
III. UNDERLYING FACTS OR DATA: THE ILLOGIC OF IT ALL
Without debating the wisdom of Rule 703, my thesis is simply that the
practice the Rule sanctions has logical implications for the evidence
acted upon. If we allow an expert to testify to a conclusion that is
premised on the belief of a certain fact (for example, an aeronautical
expert testifies that an airplane crash was not caused by pilot error,
basing the opinion in part on an FAA finding that certain defective parts
were used in the maintenance of the plane), the jury's acceptance of and
reliance upon that opinion necessarily involves the acceptance of the
truth of its factual basis. 17 Therefore, in a previous article I argued
that the jury's reliance upon the expert's conclusion necessarily involved
the jury's acceptance of the truth of the underlying facts."8 To preserve
the independent fact finding role of the jury, I advocated the admission,
for truth, of that underlying evidence. 9 I did so, however, only with

pass upon the credibility of an ordinary witness on the stand. If the statements,
then, are attested by the expert as the basis for a judgment upon which he would
act in the practice of his profession, it seems that they should ordinarily be a
sufficient basis even standing alone for his direct expression of professional
opinion on the stand, and this argument is reinforced when the opinion is founded
not only upon reports but also in part upon the expert's firsthand observation.
The data of observation will usually enable the expert to evaluate the reliability
of the statement.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15, at 24 (J. Strong, 4th ed. 1992).
16. FED. R. EVID. 703.
17. It is important to my argument that the jury has arrived at its conclusion through

the expert's opinion-having reached a conclusion because the expert said it was the
conclusion to reach. If the jury only used the expert's opinion for guidance-independently
arriving at the same conclusion from the admissible evidence in the record-the jury will
not necessarily have used the expert's opinion, and therefore, its factual basis for

evidentiary purposes. My argument is premised on the belief that because of the elevated
importance given by lay jurors to scientific opinions, the risk of the jury giving primary
evidentiary importance to expert opinions is too significant to ignore.
18. Rice, supra note 10, at 587-91.
19. Id.
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the understanding that standards should be in place to ensure that the
expert has applied her expertise in assessing the reliability of the
otherwise inadmissible evidence and can explain to the jury the reasons
for her conclusion that it is trustworthy.20
Professor Imwinkelried, quoting from an article by Professor Epps,2 '
characterized my position as "liberal" and "fearsome."22 Perhaps it is.
The anxiety it spawns, however, is the logical product of the unrestrained liberality of Rule 703, not the quixotic views of this author.
Professor Epps, and perhaps Professor Imwinkelried, advocates following
the conventional approach of permitting the expert to detail the
inadmissible basis of her opinion, but instructing the jury that the
evidence may be considered only for the limited purpose of evaluating
the expert's opinion-not as substantive proof.'2 Not explained by
either Epps or Imwinkelried, however, is how evidence, the truth of
which cannot even be considered by the jury, is supposed to be used to
assess the value of a conclusion premised on an assumption of truth.
Professor Imwinkelried, again quoting Professor Epps, noted that not
a single case has adopted the Rice view. 24 Sadly, I must acknowledge
that this is true. Perhaps this is because the proposal is too fearsome.
However, it may also be due to the fact that the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not explicitly provide for the admissibility of this evidence." Separating the body from the head of expert witness' opinions

20. Id.
21. JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 53, 64 (1994).
22. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 475.
23. Epps, supra note 21, at 72-73.
24. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 475.
25. While the existing residual exceptions in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) could be the
vehicles through which this evidence is admitted, entrenched practices against admitting
such evidence guarantee that these exceptions will seldom be employed. These rules are
identical and provide that the hearsay rule does not exclude the following types of
evidence:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement
is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
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is an accepted practice in our jurisprudence, beginning under the
common law with medical experts testifying to patients' statements of
medical history and causation that were not admissible for truth."
This practice was carried forward into the public records exception in
Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence which admits factual
findings in government agency reports based on evidence not otherwise
admissible." The jury, however, is not allowed to consider that same
evidence for its truth.28 This history of course only makes the perpetuation of the practice under Rule 703 judicially acceptable because it is

FED. R. EvID. 803(24); FED. R. EVID. 804(bX5).
26. Under the common law, medical doctors were permitted to recite what patients had
stated to them about their medical histories and causes of their problems if history and
causation were crucial to the doctors' diagnosis and to an understanding of the doctors'
treatment. The jury, however, was instructed that it could not accept those statements for
their truth even though crucial to the doctor's conclusions. See PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE:
COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5.02[E][1](a][ii], at 520 (2d ed. 1990);
Annotation, Admissibility of Physician's Testimony as to Patient's Statements or
Declarations, Other Than Res Gestae, During Medical Examination, 37 A.L.R. 3d 778
(1971). It was explained to the jury that the statements were only being repeated so that
the jury could assess the weight to be given to the doctor's testimony.
27. FED. R. EVID. 803(8Xc).
28. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1145-46
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
Furthermore, we do not believe that the drafters envisioned that 803(8)(C)
would result in the admission of all the exhibits and data that might accompany
a given staff report. As we see it, the drafters of 803(8XC) were motivated by a
variation on the theme underlying all hearsay exceptions-that circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness are provided by the presumption that governmental
officials will perform their duties faithfully. Accordingly, they were agreeable to
the receipt into evidence of governmental agency findings. We do not perceive,
however, that the drafters intended to piggyback the whole administrative
proceeding on top of the trial. To do so would permit vast amounts of time to be
spent addressing the admissibility of exhibits which are but excess baggage with
no direct bearing on the issues at trial.
Conceptionally, we believe this result is consistent with the principles of F.R.E.
703, under which an expert's opinion, based in part on inadmissible evidence, is
admissible even though the underlying data is not admissible for its truth. We
sense a reluctance on the part of the courts to permit the underlying data unless
it is independently admissible ....
[W]e adhere to the view that, unless
independently admissible, the exhibits do not come along as "excess baggage."
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familiar and comfortable.2" It does not make the practice any more
logical.
In the codification of the hearsay exception for statements of medical
diagnosis or treatment in Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,3' this illogical practice of severing the opinion from its basis was
partially resolved. Under Rule 803(4), patients' statements of medical
history and causation are now admissiblefor truth when pertinent to the
medical diagnosis or treatment sought.3" This rule eliminates the
common law requirement of the patient's desire for treatment and
relaxes the standard of admissibility. Under the common law, the
statements of medical history and causation had to be "crucial" to the
doctor's diagnosis and treatment before they could be repeated by the
physician to explain the diagnosis and treatment. Under Rule 803(4),
the statements need only be "pertinent" to the diagnosis.
Although this relaxation of the standards has diminished the inherent
reliability of the statements, they are still thought to be reliable enough
to be heard and considered by the jury for their truth when related by
the medical expert who heard and evaluated them. I am proposing that
something comparable be done under Rule 703 for all expert witnesses
whose testimony may now incorporate otherwise inadmissible evidence. 2 If the expert employs special expertise in assessing the
reliability of the evidence, and demonstrates to the presiding judge the
reason for a conclusion that those statements are sufficiently trustworthy, surely this will provide an assurance of reliability equal to

29. I do not suggest that the current practice under Rule 703 were consciously
borrowed from the common law. The evolution of the law is not always so conscious. The
long-standing palatability of this practice, however, does explain current judicial attitudes
and academic proposals under Rule 703. The history under the hearsay exception for
statements for medical diagnosis and treatment lend "analogical support" to my analysis
of Rule 703. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 476.
30. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
31. Id.
32. In the Epps article cited by Professor Imwinkelried, Epps, supra note 21, at 63 n.47,
the author criticized this analogy to Rule 803(4) and its common law precursor, arguing
that the admission of the doctor's testimony was premised on reliability stemming from the
patient's desire for treatment, not the doctor's ability to assess their reliability and her
reliance upon them. In her words, "[i]f the statements fit within the Rule, they are all
admissible, whether or not the doctor relied on them in coming to an opinion." Epps, supra
note 21, at 63 n.47. In Epp's view, "[t]he analogy to Rule 803(4) is alluring but ultimately
imperfect." Id. This conclusion is curious. My analogy to Rule 803(4) was solely for the
purpose of illustrating how the illogical practice of separating the medical expert's opinion
from its basis has been resolved by making the basis admissible for its truth. The reasons
why statements of medical history or causation are considered sufficiently reliable-patient
desire for treatment or physician capacity to evaluate reliability-were irrelevant to the
point being made.
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statements made by individuals who consult doctors solely for the
purpose of obtaining diagnoses only for use in litigation.3
While my proposal to admit for truth otherwise inadmissible evidence
is expansive, it is also restrictive in that it establishes limits on the
inadmissible evidence upon which an expert may rely. As the application of the expert's skills to assess the reliability of otherwise inadmissible evidence justifies the expanded use of that evidence, conversely, the
absence of any focused assessment by the expert justifies the opposite
conclusion. An expert should not be permitted to rely on inadmissible
evidence simply because it is of a generic "type" reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject. Absent an evaluation of that specific evidence by the
expert, the expert should be treated like any other witness relating
inadmissible hearsay directly or indirectly through his opinions.
This brings us to the question of how "reasonable reliance" should be
determined. Professor Imwinkelried and I agree that this must be
through judicial screening, but we disagree on the nature of the judicial
filter.

IV. THE JUDICIAL SCREENING FUNCTION
Professor Imwinkelried explored the various approaches taken by the

34
courts: (1) the intrusive screening apparently envisioned in Daubert;

(2) the abdication to the testifying expert's pronouncement that this type
of information is "reasonably" or "regularly" relied upon by experts in his
field of specialization-possibly a generic assessment that ignores the
specific evidence; and (3) the compromise that presumes reasonableness
from customary practice, but gives the judge the power to reject that
practice if the presumption is rebutted.35 Imwinkelried argues that the
standard for judicial screening is tied to the fundamental questions of

33. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(4) seems to support the broad
conclusion that sanctioned expert reliance should make inadmissible evidence admissible.
Addressing the common law practice of excluding from the hearsay exception statements
to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify, while letting the
physician use such statements as a basis for his testimony, the Committee stated:
While these statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert
was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind.
The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. [Rule
803(4)] accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is consistent with the
provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert testiimony is based need not
be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field.

34. See supra note 8, at 2795.
35.

Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 466-67.
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the scope of Rule 703 and in particular the terms "facts or data."" I
disagree. Judicial screening under Rule 703 is limited to facts or data
not otherwise admissible. While the focus of screening must surely
include an assessment of whether the evidence is customarily employed
by particular types of experts, (so that there is some assurance that the
experts are adept at assessing its reliability) the fundamental issue is
the reliability of the source of that data, which at the very minimum, is
a straightforward hearsay issue. The judicial screening here is no
different than under any of the delineated hearsay exceptions when the
presiding judge considers all factors bearing on the reliability of the
evidence.
The standard of reasonableness in Rule 703, and consistency with all
other instances when hearsay is presented to the finder of facts, require
a fact specific assessment that insures a minimum level of reliability.
"Reasonably relied upon" requires that the expert's reliance be demonstrated as grounded in reason-a reasoned assessment of the reliability
of the specific facts or data. Such screening also seems implicit in Rule
703, which justifies the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence on the
ground that experts have the ability, through training and experience,
to assess its reliability. Implicit in this premise is a requirement that
the presiding judge demand a demonstration by the expert that she has
employed her expertise and assessed the reliability of the evidence
at
37
hand. Without this assurance, the premise of Rule 703 is lost.
This demonstration of reliability, along with the availability of the
expert for examination in the presence of the jury, allows the conclusion
that the evidence introduced through the expert is as reliable as
evidence admitted under the delineated exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.
Therefore, the evidence should be admitted for truth. At the very
minimum, this assurance guarantees a sufficient basis for the in-court
exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence so that the
jury can make an independent assessment of reliability.
Because of the entrenched nature of practices relating to the factual
basis of expert witness testimony, a solution to this problem is unlikely
absent revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence. An explicit hearsay
exception setting forth the standards guaranteeing trustworthiness

36. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 468-69.
37. In Rice, supra note 10, at 588-91, I argued that this assessment of reliability must
focus on the particular evidence at hand rather than the generic type of evidence that it
represents. Therefore, assessment of reliability must encompass not only the generic type
(for example, a psychiatrist relying on interviews with siblings), but also the context of
those interviews and the manner in which the evidence was acquired in this case
(examinations by the psychiatrist herself, or a trained psychologist the psychiatrist has
relied upon, rather than interviews conducted by a paralegal).

1996]

COHERENT SOLUTION FOR RULE 703

505

needs to be enacted. In addition, Rule 703 must be changed to clarify
the evidentiary status that the otherwise inadmissible factual basis
acquires once the judge has determined it to be trustworthy under the
new hearsay exception. To that end, the following proposals are
advanced:'
Proposed Rule 703. Basis of Opinion Testimony by Experts3 9
(a) Scientific principles and methodologies employed. 0
(b) Factual basis of opinion. The facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
.nably
r..lid upen by xp.t in. thc
the hearing. if f a typ ra.
partieular field in fermin 3iun r infrcpneco upen the subjeet,
'L ^--ibl
in z - --c. 4' The facts
Aad-r
data need nti
thz f^mts
or data need not have been proven beforehand, however, in the
absence of admissible proof, a specific demonstration of reliability
must be made of otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements
pursuant to Rule 803(5). Evidence that is inadmissible on grounds
other than reliability, may not be relied upon by an expert witness
if disclosure of that evidence would be inconsistent with the purpose
of rule excluding it.
Proposed Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of
Declarant Immaterial4 2

38. These proposals were developed in my Advanced Evidence seminar last year. In
that seminar, students sitting as an evidence rules advisory committee, re-evaluated the
entire evidence code and proposed comprehensive revisions that will be published in a
forthcoming law review article.
39. New material is underlined. Deleted material is indicated by an overstrike.
40. In a future article, a proposed standard for the screening of scientific evidence will
be proposed under this section of Rule 703 consistent with the view that a rule entitled

"Basis of Expert Testimony" should control the whole basis-scientific and factual.

41. Language deleted from this rule and moved to new Rule 803(5), Statements

Employed in Expert Testimony.
42. Contrary to the assertion of Professor Epps, supra note 21, at 68 n.69, I did not
support the imposition of a "requirement that the hearsay declarant be unavailable" in my

Vanderbilt piece. To the contrary, when noting that imposing a requirement of unavailability could address the potential problem of parties using the expert opinion testimony
to conceal marginal evidence, I did not support this solution for a number of reasons:
First.... the probability of a party's employing such a tactic is remote. Second,
if a party attempts to establish his factual case exclusively through an expert's
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The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness:
(5)
Statement Employed in Expert Testimony. A
statement employed by an expert in arriving at a conclusion offered
by that expert at trial, to the extent that (a) the statement is of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, and (b) the expert
has demonstrated to presiding judge a basis for concluding that the
statement possesses substantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
Under these proposals, the expert may rely, on evidence that is
otherwise inadmissible only if the reliability of that evidence has been
demonstrated to the presiding judge under the new hearsay exception in
Rule 803(5). Once that demonstration has been made, the expert's
opinion becomes relevant to the case that the jury is to decide because
the basis of the opinion has become admissible. Above this threshold,
questions about reliability will go to weight rather than admissibility.
V. "FACTS OR DATA"-THE BROAD VIEW AND THE NARROW
VIEW-VARIATIONS ON THE SAME ILLOGICAL THEME

Professor Imwinkelried believes the key to resolving debates about the
scope and interpretation of Rule 703 is the narrow construction of the
terms "facts or data" (consistent with the minority view among the
courts).43 Professor Imwinkelried's approach includes only case-specific
information rather than the research data underlying the expert
reasoning applied to those case-specific facts." To bolster this conclusion, he argues, correctly in my opinion, that the use of the terms "facts
or data" in Rule 703 requires a construction consistent with the
construction of the same terms in Rule 705. 4'

testimony when independent evidence in fact is available, the judge or jurors
naturally will become suspicious and, thus, view the expert's testimony with
greater caution. Third, a party's failure to produce available evidence is the fair
subject comment by the opposition in its closing argument. Fourth, and most
important, the expert's availability for cross-examination about her biases and the
basis of her opinion should apprise the jury sufficiently of the unreliability of that
basis.

Rice, supra note 10, at 593.
43. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 451.
44. Id. at 454.

45. Id. at 455.
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He argues that the structure of Rule 705 "strongly suggests that...
'facts or data' denotes case-specific information" because: (1) "on its face,
the first sentence of the statute allows the expert to state the 'reasons'
for her opinion without stating underlying 'facts or data;'" and (2)
"interpreting 'facts or data' as including all the research data virtually
drains 'reasons' of any possible meaning" because "most components of
the expert's reasoning would be subsumed under [the terms]."46
While his interpretation of the language in Rule 703 may be correct,
his conclusion that an interpretation of "facts or data" as meaning
anything other than case-specific facts would "virtually drain 'reason' of
any possible meaning" 4 7 is not. Even if the terms "facts or data"
encompass research data, the first part of Rule 705 requires that the
expert opinion, when offered, be accompanied by "reasons therefore." To
the extent that "reasons" includes background research and other
scientific data, that "data" is an exception to the general rule making
disclosure on direct examination of the expert discretionary with the
proponent. As a consequence, this guards against "bald" conclusions
regardless of the breadth of the interpretation given to "facts or data."
It requires the expert to give an opinion with a synthesis of the casespecific facts and scientific principles underlying them-leaving the
specific details for later exploration. For example, in the hypothetical
involving the aeronautical engineer, the engineer could testify that the
accident was caused by mechanical failure (the opinion), and that due to
mechanical failure the plane rapidly lost altitude and descended in a
spiralling motion (the reason). This testimony would be allowed without
detailing the mechanical flaws found in the plane's instruments, the
evidence proving the existence of those flaws, and principles of physics
and aeronautical engineering that compelled the conclusion that those
flaws led to the plane's fatal performance.
Finally, Professor Imwinkelried argues that if the term "facts or data"
incorporates scientific principles as well as case-specific evidence, then
"the expert could therefore (offer his opinion and] withhold any
description of those components on direct examination. " 48 Consequently, "the result would be that the entire direct examination could be a
witness's bald assertion. . . .

As explained above, this conclusion is

not reasonable, but even if it were, by his interpretation the expert
would be permitted to give conclusions with no factual, case-specific
basis offered in support. Imwinkelried does not address how, in a

46. Id,
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id,
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coherent theory, a conclusion bald from lack of factual support is any
more helpful to an independent finder-of-facts under Rule 702 than that
same conclusion bald from the absence of scientific basis.
As a practical matter, bald assertions by expert witnesses pose little
problem for two reasons. First, Rules 703 and 705 do not operate in a
vacuum. The proponent of the expert's opinion will have to show that
the opinion is logically relevant under Rules 401 and 402 before it will
be "helpful" to the jury This requires a demonstration that the expert
has applied his expertise to facts that are relevant to the case at
hand. 0 In addition, the presiding judge's newly acquired screening
responsibilities under Daubert will require some disclosure of both the
case-specific facts and the scientific data relied upon.
The second reason bald assertions by expert witnesses pose little
problem is that common sense dictates that both the case-specific details
and the underlying scientific principles and data be laid before the jury
in order to make the testimony convincing. Moreover, the rules of
discovery in civil cases will serve to discourage litigants from offering
bald expert conclusions for which there is little support because the
Rules guarantee that the opponent will discover the deficiencies in the
expert's basis and analysis and will expose them on cross-examination.51
Regardless of whether a broad or narrow interpretation is given to the
term "facts or data," the reality of the illogical practice under Rule 703
of separating expert opinions from their bases is not affected. Expert
witnesses continue to play the role of the super-fact-finder, hearing

50. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992) (Expert testimony was excluded on relevance grounds
because its factual basis was not consistent with the case at hand.); Cunningham v.
Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir. 1983) (Expert drew conclusions about the
cause of a ship sinking based on hypotheses that were flatly inconsistent with the evidence
presented at the trial.); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir.

1977) (Summary judgment granted because plaintiff's expert made unsupported
assumptions about the nature of the automotive market that was inconsistent with the
reality of a market dominated by two forces-Ford and General Motors.).
51. While parties may not wish to exercise their option under Rule 705 by offering
expert opinions without a statement of the underlying facts or data, some federal trial

judges have begun to follow the practice of requiring experts to state their opinions without
underlying facts or data being elicited-requiring that the basis be explored initially on
cross-examination and thereafter on redirect. This practice seems both unfair and illadvised. It is unfair because it separates the presentation of the opinion from the
exploration of its basis. It is ill-advised because it saves no judicial time-what normally

occurs on direct examination is shifted to redirect examination, which in turn necessarily
expands the final examination on recross.
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others may not hear and offering conclusions as a fait
evidence 5that
2
accompli.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Imwinkelried's proposal to limit the meaning of the term
"facts or data" is not a panacea for all of the problems of Rule 703. The
illogical practice of severing the expert opinion from its basis is neither
addressed nor changed by limiting the definition of these terms. Rule
703 permits expert witnesses to rely on inadmissible evidence, but
provides no guidance to judges on how and for what purpose this
expanded basis should be incorporated into the trial. If experts are
permitted to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, standards should
be in place for ensuring that the reliability of that evidence has been
assessed by the expert and explained to the jury. These guarantees of
reliability in place, the otherwise inadmissible evidence should be
admissible for truth.

52. Rice, supra note 10, at 586.

